This paper asks whether the model of international labour migration regulation found in the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) "Mode 4" conforms to principles of global justice. To answer this question on the backdrop of the complex set of policy considerations relating to labour migration, I explore four competing theories of global justice: Cosmopolitanism; Statist Realism; Rawlsian "Society-of-Peoples"; and Nationalism. While the initial assumptions of these approaches are far removed from each other, and their ideal prescriptions seem mutually incompatible, a shift to non-ideal formulations reveals a broad range of commonalities and complementarities. From these one may derive general principles that delineate the common ground of international migration regimes that might be morally acceptable to all approaches. These include the encouragement of global distributive justice; the protection of basic human rights of migrants; promotion of the effectiveness of migration policy; and emergency safeguards for migration receiving states. As analyzed in the article's final section, the GATS Mode 4 does not satisfy any of these requirements.
Introduction
The WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 1 "Mode 4" is currently the only internationally agreed legal instrument with the potential to become a functioning multilateral labour migration regime. 2 It is an international mechanism aimed at liberalizing labour mobility 3 on the basis of qualified negotiated commitments by states to accept nonpermanent foreign labour migrants, subject to substantive rules that regulate and restrict states' unilateral labour immigration policies.
International trade and migration specialists query whether Mode 4 is effective as a global economic regime, and what may be done to make it work better (OECD: 2004) . In this article I ask, rather, if GATS Mode 4 is just: does the model of international labour migration regulation that it represents conform to principles of global justice? This question is closely related to evaluations of the morality of national immigration policies, but is independent of them, going one step beyond and considering an international legal and institutional migration arrangement from a global justice perspective. 4 The exercise clearly holds lessons for the design of any future labour migration regime, but it is also important in the more general WTO context. To the extent that the WTO purportedly represents a global economic "constitution" for globalization, as is sometimes suggested, 5 it must be sensitive to conflicting political and philosophical visions of global justice and the way that they relate to 1 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994 , Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L. M. 1125 (1994) . 2 Regional labour mobility arrangements do exist, though their scope is usually limited (Nielson: 2003) . The exception is the freedom of movement of workers in the European Union, that while not free of any of the problems discussed here, is geographically restricted to the European regional space and more importantly, is deeply embedded within an advanced system of economic and political integration. For a comprehensive, if not up to date, monograph on the subject, see Weiss: 2002. 3 The GATS aims to achieve higher levels of liberalization in the international trade in services, towards "the growth and development of the world economy"; see GATS Preamble. 4 For a series of critiques of global institutions, primarily from a cosmopolitan point of view, see Barry and Pogge: 2005. 5 'Constitutionalism' in the WTO is multi-faceted. For a thorough critique, see Dunoff: 2006 , and the sources cited there.
international economic disparity. 6 This is especially poignant with respect to GATS Mode 4, because labour migration is strongly associated with transnational differentials in wages, social benefits and skills, and because immigration policy constitutes a major a fault line between cosmopolitan and communitarian liberal theories of global justice.
How does a trade agreement relate to labour mobility? 7 The GATS applies to labour as an internationally tradeable service. Under article I:2 GATS, the agreement covers four "Modes" of international service provision. 8 Among these, "Mode 4", is the provision of a service "by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of another WTO Member". This entails movement of labour for the purpose of supplying a service on site in a foreign, service-importing country, and may include either self-employed suppliers remunerated directly by consumers or employees of service suppliers (Carzaniga: 2003, 23) . Such labour mobility may occur in any of the service sectors covered by the GATS (e.g., health professionals, construction workers, tour guides, accountants or software developers). 9 However, the GATS applies only to labour-migration that is service-related and does not establish free movement of yet unemployed labour. The GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement expressly provides that the GATS "shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis". This caveat has regulatory implications that technically (if not artificially) differentiate GATS commitments from immigration laws, and service-provision from labour. Mode 4 may facilitate the mobility of workers, but these enter a foreign country under GATS as service suppliers for the purpose of supplying a service in a specific sector. They cannot enter for the purpose of seeking 6 For a general egalitarian critique of the WTO, see Moellendorf: 2005. 7 The well-worn disclaimer apologizing for the brevity of the background discussion is especially apt here. For a good introduction to the GATS see WTO: 2005. 8 The four Modes are (1) Cross Border Supply (supply of a service "from the territory of one Member to the territory of any other Member"); (2) Consumption Abroad (supply of a service "in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member"); (3) Commercial Presence (supply of a service "by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member"); and (4) Temporary Presence of Natural Persons. 9 The GATS covers twelve general service sectors (Business, Communication, Construction and Engineering, Distribution, Education, Environment, Financial, Health, Tourism and Travel, Recreation, Culture and Sporting, Transport, and the catch-all "Other"), that are further divided into sub-sectors.
employment, and their entry is for a limited period of time, as may be necessary for the provision of a service under contract.
The GATS does, however, cover significant labour-intensive service sectors, and there is substantial overlap between the Mode 4 definitional concept of the supply of a service through presence of natural persons and what would more regularly be considered temporary movement of labour. For example, a foreign company providing services in the sub-sector "General construction work for buildings" (CPC 512), which includes "construction work (including new work, additions, alterations and renovation work) for all types of buildings, residential or non-residential, whether privately or publicly owned" (for discussion, see WTO, 1998) in a service-importing country, could do so either through
Mode 3 commercial presence, contracting local labour or (if so allowed by local laws and regulations that may or may be not anchored in a GATS Mode 4 specific commitment)
through the temporary presence of construction workers from its home country or from other WTO Members. From the GATS legal perspective these labourers would be service providers; they would not necessarily have a labour contract in the host country, nor have any right to seek further employment there, let alone a right to pursue permanent residence and citizenship. However, in direct economic terms they would be fully equivalent to temporary labour.
The GATS attempts to adjust the classical legal principles of trade in goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 10 to the more complex areas of trade in services. Thus, as a general obligation, the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle applies to all measures covered by the agreement, in any service sector, preventing discrimination between service suppliers from different WTO Members (article II). 11 However, a Member must allow service suppliers access to its market only in those sectors and in those modes of supply in which it has entered specific commitments in its GATS schedule, subject to any terms and conditions specified therein (article XVI). The national treatment principle that prevents discrimination between domestic and foreign service suppliers, similarly applies only to sectors in which a Member has elected to make specific market access commitments (article XVII).
Taken together (and at face value), these principles mean that if a WTO Member commits to open its services market in a certain sector under Mode 4, it must provide market access, MFN and national treatment to foreign labour, significantly constraining the autonomy of its labour immigration policy in that sector. It is therefore not surprising that specific commitments under Mode 4 have so far been very modest and subject to significant reservations (for example, a significant portion of commitments made are restricted to "intra-corporate transferees", whose presence is related to Mode 3, investment related commitments; executives; and business visitors (Carzaniga: 2003, 25) ).
Mode 4's small impact in practice enhances rather than diminishes the unique opportunity that it provides us to examine the global justice implications of a multilateral labour migration regime, as applied. Indeed, a pragmatic view holds the concepts of justice and effectiveness as mutually reinforcing. Mode 4's practical weaknesses hint at the existence of both political impossibilities and moral deficiencies. In contemplating the ethics of global labour migration regimes in general, and the GATS Mode 4 in particular, this article considers that neither pure consequentialist analysis nor untainted deontological thinking will prove satisfactory. When applied to problems of international labour migration, ideal theories of global justice lead to prescriptions that are either politically impractical (e.g., utopianly advocating fully "open borders") or practically unhelpful (e.g., merely upholding the right of states to regulate the entry of labour migrants to their territory). 12 Nonetheless, the opportunity costs and real injustices of the current virtually unregulated international environment are too high to ignore. The question of international labour migration regulation thus lies deep in the realm of "non-ideal theory", in which we must search for "policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as 12 A similar problem has been noted with respect to the ethics of refugee policy (an area whose guiding justifications distinct from those of labour migration): "Political philosophy appears to present us with a rather polarized choice between a communitarian, or nationalist, ethics of closure and an expansive, universalist ethics of inclusion that appears to impose unfeasible demands" (Boswell: 2006, 664). likely to be effective" (Rawls: 1999, 89) . 13 Making the gradual shift from ideal to non-ideal even more difficult, the field is bogged with empirical uncertainty and scientific controversy.
If "any defensible global political theory must rely on factual statements about the world" (Caney: 2005, 2) , a global theory of labour migration regulation must, at least for the time being, rely on incomplete facts, and so maintain a degree of flexibility in accommodating competing political and philosophical perspectives.
This article ultimately argues that Mode 4 fails to meet even these elastic benchmarks,
and is in at least this sense inappropriate as a prototypical labour migration regime. 13 This reference to Rawls does not imply that I adhere to Rawls' distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory as dependent on the (non-)existence of a world in which "all peoples accept and follow the (ideal of the) Law of Peoples" considered as "well-ordered peoples" (Rawls: 1999, 4, 89) . More generally, the gap between ideal and non-ideal theory depends on political realities. If ideal theory suggests that states should maintain full control over immigration, non-ideal theory would acknowledge that in practice borders are highly permeable to migration that the state might not be interested in; and if ideal theory conversely indicates that the world should be borderless, non-ideal theory would acknowledge that in practice states impose strict barriers to migration. On the transition from ideal to non-ideal theory, see Phillips: 1985; and with specific reference to migration, see Carens: 1996. home to 28. A common point of departure in this debate is the assessment of net global welfare gain from labour migration, as well as potential benefits for both developed and developing countries. Estimates of the overall economic gains from the elimination of all restrictions on labour mobility are as high as a net doubling of worldwide annual GNP, leading to a fairer international distribution of income as well (Hamilton and Whalley, 1984) . More conservative estimates also indicate very significant welfare gains from freer movement of people (Winters, 2003) . The potential benefits of increased international labour mobility are strongly linked to economic differentials between developed countries and developing countries (or as one economist has bluntly put it, "[I]f people were goods, the solution to different wage and employment levels would be obvious: encourage the transfer of 'surplus'
people from poorer to richer nation states" (Martin: 2004, 443) Beyond the aggregate global economic considerations, labour migration is regarded as an extremely important generator of economic benefits for developing countries and for the weaker segments of their societies. Empirical research has found that international migration has a strong impact on the reduction of poverty in developing countries (Adams and Page: 2003) . In the rosiest scenario, labour migration can achieve a "win-win-win" outcome: the emigrating individuals receive higher income and improved benefits, the country of origin benefits from financial remittances, overpopulation relief, poverty reduction, and "networking" effects with its diaspora; and the receiving country gains a workforce that addresses pressing economic and demographic needs (Tanner: 2005, 23-24) . 1999). 15 If not power -even once a national immigration policy is formulated, it is often very difficult to enforce, causing much of the migration debate to deal with the management of "illegal" immigration. For a provocative discussion of the distinction between national immigration policy targets ("first-order" immigration rules) and the different national rules and institutions used to implement them, ex ante and ex post ("second-order" immigration rules), see Cox and Posner: 2006. Thus, the US debates its policy towards "illegal" immigrants and the construction of a wall-like barrier on the Mexican border. Europeans ponder the costs and benefits of allowing the "Polish plumber" in, under equitable terms or otherwise. Israelis argue how labour migrants impact upon the preservation of national agrarian ideals, how the treatment of temporary labourers can conform to the national civil rights regime, and how "demography" will be affected by the continued importation of labourers from Eastern
Europe, China and South East Asia, themselves substitutes for cheap Palestinian labour now excluded for political conflict-related reasons (Rosenhek: 2000) .
The national interest debate can be broken down into a political-economic aspect and a social-communitarian aspect. In the first, what is on the line are the general and distributive economic effects of increased labour immigration, including their impact on the incumbent skilled and unskilled workforce, on industry and on labour unions. Because of the implications for sensitive interest groups and the intuitive fear of losing jobs, research in this area is susceptible to political capture. However, among economists there is an emerging dominant view that in most scenarios only the least-skilled native workers suffer adverse effects from increased labour migration and that these effects are small and countervailable by domestic social policy measures rather than immigration restrictions (Chang, 2007) . The social-communitarian dimension of the debate relates to the impact of increased immigration on the character and definition of the national community. Academically, this is a primarily philosophical and sociological debate, but in practice it is highly politicized, as natural chauvinistic tendencies merge with job-loss fear to form electoral platforms.
The national interest debate clearly involves ideal moral deliberation and serves as a focal point for differences between cosmopolitan and communitarian liberal approaches. One might rightly ask, what is the moral justification for the concepts of "borders", "citizenship"
and "nationality", the fundamental terms upon which the national interest debate depends in both its economic and communitarian aspects. However, from a lawyer's pragmatic perspective, these questions are scholastic. What is more important is that international law de lege lata accepts that states have the authority, if not the obligation, to regulate labour immigration (Aleinikoff: 2003, 3) . In terms of non-ideal theory, it would appear useless to argue that states do not have the moral right to regulate the influx of labour migrants, by measures taken either at the border (e.g., in the form of admittance criteria, licensing procedures and the like) or "behind the border" (e.g., by prescribing equal or differential employment conditions and social rights for migrant workers). This is an authority that states exercise in practice (albeit with varying degrees of success), and so it must be taken well into account when evaluating the justness of global migration regimes.
(c) The 'Migrant Welfare/Rights' Debate
The last, though not least important, dimension of the labour migration debate relates to the rights and welfare of labour migrants themselves, as individuals. Although labour may be commoditized as a "factor of production", labour migrants do not act like commodities; rather, they are non-passive human actors (and beings), driven by aspirations that transcend simple economic logic. International migration is a clear expression of people's aspirations to improve their lot, 16 as practiced by a significant chunk of humanity. 17 These observations may be obvious but they have significant policy implications for international labour migration regimes, relating to both effectiveness and justness. Migrants that are highly motivated and determined to enter a foreign labour market in the face of immigration restrictions will take great risks, even life threatening ones, and endure great hardships to do so: braving shark-infested waters in rickety, overcrowded boats, walking for weeks through inhospitable deserts (and many times, dying there (Cornelius: 2001)), paying excessive premiums to people-smugglers and labour contractors, subsequently living invisible, undocumented lives, treated "like rustlers, like thieves". 18 For "illegal" or "irregular"
16 Among migrants, the "vast majority […] move in search of better economic opportunities" while only 10% are considered "refugees" (IOM: 2005, 379-381). A "Refugee" is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country"; see Article 1(a)(2) of the 1951 United Nations ("UN") Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150; and Article 1(2) of the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267. These definitions clearly exclude migrants who simply migrate in pursuit of better lives. In practice, however, there are obvious gaps and overlaps between such economic migrants and refugees -people counted as political refugees even though they have sufficient cause to seek economic migration, or economic migrants who are also politically persecuted, or people whose economic deprivation is the result of political persecution -these may all be counted as both economic migrants and refugees. 17 The 175 Million figure mentioned above reflects only the number of those people who have actually managed to realize their migratory hopes under the current international regulatory conditions, which are not conducive to labour migration, to say the least. A more liberal labour migration regime would likely multiply the number of migrants manifold, for better or for worse. 18 Woody Guthrie, Deportees (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos).
immigrants, it matters little whether the immigration restrictions that they are circumventing are unilaterally imposed by the target country's government, or the result of an internationally agreed migration regime. It cannot be assumed willy-nilly that a global labour migration regime will be any easier to enforce than national migration policy. Thus, in order to be effective, its design must take into account migrants' willingness to adjust to the regime, increasing incentives to comply with it. Furthermore, as a matter of legal context, migrants have been granted several specific rights under international law, including protection from racism and racial discrimination, procedural rights in case of expulsion and in some cases national treatment in work conditions (for an overview, see Fitzpatrick: 2003) , although often these rights are not enjoyed by them in practice. For the sake of legal consistency, a labour migration regime must take account of these rights.
The area of migrant rights is of independent importance, and many might consider that it is the core of the moral problems relating to immigration. Moreover, the debate becomes particularly important for present purposes when it raises questions that may contradict goals and interests that emerge at the global development or national interest levels. For example, enhanced migrant rights may agitate towards granting temporary labour migrants social protection at the level granted to domestic labourers. However, in welfare states this would impose significant fiscal burdens that reduce the willingness of governments to allow labour immigration, thus foregoing the national and global benefits of labour mobility altogether. This is what has been called the "immigration paradox": the liberal commitment to grant migrant workers equal rights once admitted to the labour market agitates against their admission, in which case migrants may end up worse off than they would have been if they had been admitted yet granted lesser rights (Chang: 2003) . Furthermore, the entire concept of "temporary" labour migration, which in theory is attractive to both national interests (e.g., by reducing social disruption) and global development (e.g., by reducing brain drain and increasing remittances) is problematic from a migrant rights perspective, to the extent that enforcement of the temporariness of migrants' stay may involve infringement of their human rights and dignity (such as detention although they have committed no offense, or labour licensing arrangements that bind migrants to a single employer in a manner tantamount to enslavement).
These are the main dimensions of the labour migration, that pose any would-be international labour migration regime with a policy justice "trilemma": how to encourage welfare-enhancing and poverty reducing labour migration while accommodating and/or overcoming national-interest based resistance, and preserving the rights of migrants? Is there a coherent moral approach to global justice that might be able to take all factors of this equation into account?
3. Political-Philosophical Approaches to International Labour Migration Regimes The reflexive responses to these queries rest on "sovereignty" and "community" (at times mutually compatible, but not always so). States are mainly defined by their territory, population and government. Their sovereign governors are charged with the maintenance of order in their territory, the well-being of their nationals and the national interest. Their first order of duty is therefore accepted as owed to their own "people". It might then be argued that states and their nationals have no obligations towards non-compatriots, and that national immigration control is legitimately self-interested, with openness towards immigration at most a display of charity or hospitality, not moral obligation. 19 Most reasons advanced for limitations on immigration fall well within the bounds of the "national interest" debate discussed above: nationals pay taxes, non-nationals do not; immigrants harm the economic well-being of (some) nationals; immigration increases inequality among incumbents within the state; immigration compromises national culture; immigration erodes the capacity of national institutions to provide the just entitlements of nationals (for a survey and rebuttal of such arguments supporting immigration restrictions, see Moellendorf: 2002, 61-67; and Goodin: 1992, 6-11) .
In response to these national/communitarian defenses of restrictions on immigration, universalist or cosmopolitan critiques argue, on the basis of the shared humanity of nationals and non-nationals, that international borders should generally be open, and that the only justifiable immigration restrictions are those that would apply in equal force towards nationals at home (mutatis mutandis) (Carens: 1987) . While these "openborder" arguments focus on the (im)morality of restrictions on international free movement because of the injustice they cause individuals (raising arguments related to the "migrant welfare/rights" debate), they muster additional force by pointing out that national immigration restrictions impair global distributive justice, serving as barriers to movement from poorer countries to more affluent and developed ones (thus engaging in the "global development" debate). For an interesting case study of Australian employment visa requirements on the backdrop of Derrida's reading of Kant's right to hospitality, see Kordvani: 2006 (referring to Derrida: 2001 . 20 See, e.g., Caney's reference to a "standard economics textbook" (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch: 1991, 644) maintaining that "[t]he quickest way to equalize world income distribution would be to permit free migration between countries" (see Caney: 2005, 106) .
own independent immigration policies may be judged separately, but when examining international labour migration policy regimes from a pragmatic moral perspective, it should rather be taken as a given, a worst-/best-case expression of political reality. The intellectual task in the present case is not to critique national immigration policies as such, but to identify the contours of morally defensible and practically effective global structures of international labour migration regulation.
The next sections examine migration regimes from different perspectives, referring to Caney's useful classification of theories of global justice, consisting of cosmpolitanism;
realism; 'society-of-states' approaches (including Rawls' 'society-of-peoples'); and nationalism (Caney: 2005, 3) . Each theory naturally gravitates towards a certain ideal-type of international labour migration regime. However, when the real multi-dimensional complexities of the global labour migration debate are grafted on to ideal theory, each approach proves capable of adjustment, suggesting a number of general policy prescriptions. These provide us with a common, pragmatic basis for evaluating international labour migration regimes, the outer bounds of what is considered morally acceptable, if not ideally so, by each theory.
(b) Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitan approaches emphasize the equal moral worth of all human beings, independent of group membership, from which derive universally applicable mutual obligations among all persons (Pogge: 1994, 89; Tan: 2004, 2) . Important expressions of moral cosmopolitanism are extensions of the basic principles of Rawls' liberal A Theory of Justice (Rawls: 1971) to the international sphere (Beitz: 1999 (Beitz: [1979 , 127-136; Pogge: 1989) , although Rawls himself rejected this project (Rawls: 1999) .
Applied to questions of international labour migration, cosmopolitanism, as a form of liberal egalitarianism, agitates against national immigration control. 21 "Open borders" are preferred, as these would best conform to the global equality of opportunity among human beings that can be understood as cosmopolitanism's underlying system of distributive justice 21 See Carens: 1992, 43: "liberal egalitarianism entails a deep commitment to freedom of movement which can be overridden at the level of principle only with great difficulty". (Caney: 2005, 122-123) . 'National interest' is pushed aside, the focus being on international development and migrant rights. This might be somewhat qualified to the extent that entirely free movement of people might induce chaotic outcomes that would cause excessive harm to incumbents and also undermine the achievement of the rights it was intended to promote (Carens: 1987, 259) , or might otherwise be tempered by attempts to resolve gaps between national immigration restrictions and the liberal cosmopolitan paradigm. 22 There is however no intention here to reopen this aspect of the debate, i.e., are national immigration restrictions themselves morally justified? Rather, the question is, given that states retain the authority to restrict labour immigration to their territory, what would be the attributes of an international global migration regime that would be morally acceptable from a cosmopolitan perspective? In answering this question two general parameters emerge.
First, a (non-ideal) cosmopolitan approach would evaluate the extent to which an international migration regime encourages states to liberalize immigration in patterns that promote global distributive justice in cosmopolitan terms. This is not merely to say that the more migration restrictions are removed or reduced, the better, but that the regime should obligate and motivate well-off states to allow immigration (a) from those locations whose residents would most benefit from increased migration (these may not necessarily be states, but in reality it would be very difficult to apply this logic otherwise); and (b) of those migrant workers who would most benefit from migration (themselves, as well as their families). This formulation is a practical interpretation of the cosmopolitan's global application of Rawls' "difference principle", whereby social and economic inequalities should be arranged to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged to be acceptable.
Second, a cosmopolitan approach would assess the way the regime applies to the individual migrant and his or her dependants. (c) Realism
Realists are statist communitarian's who assert that to the extent international relations include a moral component, it is that states have an obligation to pursue their own interest, not utopian ideals such as universal equity (Morgenthau: 1951; Waltz: 1979) . 23 Yet as we have seen, the 'national interest' debate in the labour migration context is fraught with definitional and empirical problems, presenting the realist with difficult policy choices.
However, this uncertainty may ossify realist perspectives of international migration regimes, in both principle and practice, rather than loosen them. For the realist, a legally binding migration regime would at first blush not seem to accomplish anything that a state might not achieve through unilateral policy. Long-term commitments would constrain the state from adjusting its immigration policy to changing needs and interests over time. The first choice of the realist would therefore likely be to remain with the current 'regime', i.e., the condition in which states have overall and essentially absolute authority to determine their labour migration policy.
This rigid realist approach would, however, ignore the real, non-moral, constraints on the ability of the state to unilaterally pursue its interests, however defined. These constraints include, at minimum, the difficulties faced by states in preventing the entry of immigrants that their self-interested policy has defined as 'unwanted'; and the problem of enforcing the temporariness of 'wanted' temporary immigration. These are problems that might be mitigated through international cooperation, increasing the attractiveness of an international migration regime even in realist eyes. A (non-ideal) realist approach might therefore accept an international labour regime that would conform to the following parameters:
First, an international labour regime should provide significant payoffs to migrationattracting states in areas in which unilateral policy has proven ineffective, to the detriment of In contrast to cosmopolitanism, society-of-states approaches to international political-philosophy acknowledge that states have independent value as bearers of moral rights. Although these approaches are also statist-communitarian, they differ from realism in that they recognize that states have moral duties beyond the state itself, that is, towards other states, though not individuals. Taken in conjunction, these elements of a society-of-states approach would maintain that "a just global order is one in which there are states and the states accept that they have moral duties to other states" (Caney: 2005, 10 ).
Society-of-states theories are highly attuned to current international legal structural realities. Indeed, if one supplants the 'moral' with the 'legal', society-of-states approaches are formally similar to traditional Westphalian doctrines of international law as reflected in contemporary international relations. How would these approaches apply to the idea of an international labour migration regime? Taken narrowly, a society-of-states approach would merely uphold the independence of states' policy-making as constrained by the principle of non-intervention (Bull: 1977) . In actual terms, this would be far less of an obstacle to an international migration regime than a realist approach, merely granting states unconstrained authority (and hence, the discretion to cooperate) in the area of immigration control, but not linking migration policy to a particular policy guideline, such as the 'national interest'.
However, we must also address the implications of a more complex (if controversial)
'society-of-states' theory, that is, Rawls' 'society-of-peoples' (Rawls: 1999) . 24 Rawls' assumes that most migration is caused by the effects of bad governance in the source country (1999, (8) (9) . Free movement would therefore cause the costs of the bad governance of non-liberal, non-decent peoples to be borne by liberal and decent peoples. With respect to 'burdened societies', while the duty to assist may not include migration as a method of assistance, 28 it ought to be the case that the immigration policy of well-ordered peoples should not be allowed to contradict the aims of the duty of assistance.
Thus, immigration policy should not impair the prospects of burdened societies to gain the independent capacity to manage their affairs reasonably. Surely this implies that immigration policies should avoid enhancing 'drain brain' problems in developing countries, and encourage the return of labour income to their economies. These are goals that might better be achieved through international cooperative arrangements, and so an international labour migration regime that promotes the goal of the duty of assistance should be accepted as reasonable by liberal and decent societies. This would be the case even if the labour migration regime established obligations on well-ordered societies to accept immigrants.
One qualification to this is Rawls' concern that egalitarian ideals should not be foisted on non-liberal societies. Rawls rejects cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice because they would be 'intolerant' to non-liberal societies (Rawls: 1999, 59 et seq.) . This does not appear to be a concern because a labour migration regime that did not intervene in the political systems of source countries by imposing political or economic policy conditionality would be considered 'tolerant' in this sense.
In addition, Rawls agrees that peoples have a duty to honor human rights. Thus, a regime that promoted respect for migrants' rights (to be distinguished from the right to migrate) would be morally acceptable and even desirable. Furthermore, although Rawls rejects equality of opportunity as a moral principle at the global level, he does include the right to means of subsistence among the rights to be respected (Rawls: 1999, 65) . To be sure, this cannot form the basis for a right to migrate, but if an international labour migration regime had as one of its objectives the promotion of this right, this would not be objectionable, even if it applied to non-decent peoples.
In sum, an international labour migration regime would be morally consistent with Rawls' theory if it increased the capacity of burdened societies to become well-ordered, respected human rights and promoted the right to subsistence, while avoiding the imposition of egalitarian ideals upon non-liberal societies. Rawls 'society-of-peoples' accepts global inequality but does not mandate it; thus, while it may not demand an international labour migration regime, such a regime could be considered morally attractive, under these conditions.
(e) Nationalism
Communitarian nationalism attaches moral significance to nationality, bearing on rights and duties (Caney: 2005, 13) . This is distinct from a realist approach, because a 'nation' is a community with a shared ethnic or cultural identity, as opposed to the state conceived of as a political entity. I will not linger on the merits of these distinctions or their implicationsindeed, even 'nationalist' philosophers blur them at times (e.g., Miller: 2004, referring to the justification of immigration policies of 'nation-states'). For present purposes, what is important is that a nationalist perspective would require an international labour regime to strengthen the nation's capacity to enforce its immigration policy, even at the cost of making prior commitments to accept migrants; and would also, like the realist approach, expect a migration regime to provide effective safeguards should increased immigration pose a threat to the nation. Nov. 28. 1979 , GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980 . 33 Article V:2 allows a degree of flexibility to developing countries who are party to such regional services' trade agreements in the application of national treatment, but this would appear to merely permit developing countries to retain some discrimination in favour of local service-suppliers, and could not sanction an agreement whose main function was to grant market access to service-providers from a developing country.
GATS
specifically permits the establishment of bilateral or regional labour market integration agreements, but these would have to be fully integrative. Thus, the GATS does not include provisions that could be the basis for limited preferences for developing countries in Mode 4. Moreover, when the services provisions of existing North-South regional trade agreements are examined (Nielson: 2003) the Article V GATS consistency of many of them is questionable, because they provide for only limited or controlled GATS-style 'positive list' sectoral liberalization, and some do not at all liberalize the movement of labour beyond GATS commitments.
As for discrimination in favour of particularly deserving migrants, technically this is possible (e.g., by restricting market access in a given sector to labour migrants with an annual source-country income below a certain threshold), but no schedules of specific commitments do so in practice. Indeed, at a more fundamental level, the GATS' somewhat euphemistic treatment of labour migration as services-provision, and its exclusion of employment seeking migrants 34 significantly impair the capacity of Mode 4 to promote global equality of opportunity among potential migrant workers.
Another deficiency in Mode 4's potential to facilitate labour migration promotive of distributive justice is Article XVII GATS national treatment. In areas in which market access has been granted under Mode 4, labour migrants cum service suppliers must receive treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to domestic labourers, by any measure affecting the supply of services. Although Article XVII has its roots in international trade theory and Article III GATT 1947, not in international human rights law, it exemplifies the liberal immigration paradox. On the basis of Article XVII GATS, one might argue that foreign labour migrants must receive national minimum wage and social benefits. In some cases, this would deter the introduction of labour from low-wage countries, having been robbed of its competitive advantage, and hence trapped in its domestic setting. National treatment, originally designed to overcome non-tariff barriers to international trade, is in these cases a barrier to both trade and development. Beyond formal equality as such, human rights infringements do not necessarily arise in this scenario, as I will discuss presently, but distributive outcomes are thwarted. 34 As per the GATS Annex, supra section 1.
Last but not least, the GATS simply does not include any language that might prevent labour migration policies of developed countries that are potentially detrimental to the social, economic and political development of developing countries. Brain drain and remittance dependence concerns are not incorporated into the GATS in any way.
(c) Human Rights Protection
The relationship between WTO disciplines and international human rights norms is a complex one, raising many international legal and 'constitutional' problems. 35 Moreover, the specific nexus between GATS Mode 4 and human rights is ostensibly far simpler in the sense that the rights in question are the rights of the actual workers whose migration is to be enabled by commitments under the GATS itself, not of indirectly affected persons (such as labourers manufacturing traded goods), and as we have seen, even a non-ideal global justice analysis would sincerely expect a labour migration regime to provide basic human rights protection.
Moreover, the GATS does not require Members to protect labour migrants from violations of basic human rights or to make international commitments in this respect. In 
(d) Migration Policy Effectiveness
Quite simply, the GATS does not provide Members receiving temporary labour migration under Mode 4 with any legal or other mechanism that would make migration policy any more effectively enforceable. Labour-attracting states interested in an international regime that might assist them in making their immigration patterns more predictable and controllable will not find any comfort in the GATS. This is noted here from a global justice perspective, but as in other cases, it is supported by political and economic considerations: World Bank economists have pointed out that the GATS is an ineffective mechanism for liberalizing international labour migration, because it does not include or even allow commitments from labour-providing states to repatriate labour migrants (Amin and Mattoo: 2005) . Such commitments would of course need to conform to international human rights norms that limit a state's ability to prevent people from leaving their territory, while establishing obligations to receive prodigal nationals. The GATS, however, is quite oblivious to these issues.
(e) Emergency Safeguards
The GATS does not currently include any general emergency safeguard mechanisms, let alone in the specific contexts of GATS Mode 4 labour migration. Article X GATS calls for negotiations on the topic, but deadlines for the completion of these talks have been repeatedly missed and the default is that such safeguards do not exist. As an alternative, Article XXI GATS could permit a labour-receiving Member to modify or withdraw a GATS commitment, at any time after three years have elapsed from the date on which that commitment entered into force, subject to compensatory adjustments made towards Members whose GATS benefits have been affected by the modification or withdrawal.
However, such a change in commitments would not be temporary ex ante, nor contingent on emergency conditions.
Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to tease out the basic principles of an international labour migration regime that could conform to competing theories of global justice on a pragmatic, non-ideal basis, and address the multitude of problems associated with the international labour migration debate. I have shown that these principles should include elements of global distributive justice, human rights protection, immigration policy enforcement and contingent emergency safeguards or 'escape clauses'. These principles reflect not only a philosophical common ground between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches to this difficult area, but also a compromise among different political views.
However, the GATS Mode 4 spectacularly fails to meet any of these criteria. It is as ineffective in the promotion of global distributive justice as it is in the strengthening of migration policy enforcement, and as inadequate in the protection of human rights as it is in the prevention of seriously detrimental effects of labour migration. The establishment of a global labour migration regime that is morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective (Rawls: 1999, 89) will no doubt require careful consideration, negotiation and time;
but the GATS Mode 4 does not appear to be the appropriate model, in too many senses.
